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31 March 2008
28 March 2008
Some thoughts on "apples"
(sorry guys, I tried to fix the weird spacing and ended up deleting y'all's comments! I fail.)
In discussing the events at the Abu Ghraib prison, we've been dealing with the question of whether this was an isolated incident, propogated by a handful of errant, sick, cruel MPs (the "bad apples"), or if this was one incident in a string of many incidents that share the same basic fact pattern and environmental/cultural conditions (the "bad barrel"). Most of us have handled this division in our blogs, and I had a few thoughts on some of the related issues.
The Administration has said from the very beginning that the disgrace that was the AGP events esd the result of a few "bad apples" misbehaving and taking serious liberties with their positions. It was represented to the American people that these kind of things were not policy, were one-off abuses by a bunch of yahoos and that those involved would be severely punished, as well as the commanders who were responsible for their subordinates and should have maintained tighter discipline. Case closed.
At first, it would seem that the public believed this reasoning, for a number of reasons. We're taught to believe our leaders, to trust their judgement and wisedom. We're also more inclinded to believe what we're told by the people who are in charge, especially when it doesn't involve us directly. (Think the Stanley Milgram experiement on obdience to authority.)
I would argue also that we lay people, who are not military people or have no special expertise, really want to believe that the AGP events really are one-off abuses, that the whole system is not structured to encourage/condone/produce such monstrosities. We're Americans, after all, and we don't abuse, torture, humiliate, degrade or chew with our mouths open. This is what makes us better than those 'A-rab and Al-Qaeda heathens, an' don't you forgit it!'
However, the evidence suggests otherwise:
· *We have a number of public documents that indicate that harsh treatment (oddly similiar to practices the US has condemmed as torture when used by other nations) has been authorized for use "when appropriate."
· *We have a military fighting an insurgency, which historically does not bring out the solider's most kindly responses.
· *We have an atmosphere of 'do what needs to be done, at any cost."
· *We have a group of soldiers who are not trained for the job they've been told to do.
· *We have a group of soldiers who are quite young and inexperienced.
· *We have weak oversight from the General in charge of the area
· *We have a higher General with a reputation for setting up facilities that "get results" coming into the theatre and making sweeping administrative changes, namely putting Military Intelligence in effective (though not formal) control of AGP.
· *We have the influence of agents from "OGAs" ("Other Government Agencies") who don't seem to be bound to any sort of pesky rules and regulations on what they may or may not do to detainees.
· *We have a continued campaign from the highest levels that has branded all Iraqis who are suspected of misdeeds, often on little more than rumours or denounciations, as dangerous "terrorists" who are so wicked and evil that they're not really people.
· *We have a group of "bad apples" who, despite being vilified in the open, most of whom get relatively light punishments for minor offences. Only the supposed ring leader of the group gets a harsh punishment for a serious offence, and even that seems odd somehow.
Doesn't this sound much more like a "bad barrel," into which these otherwise good soliders were thrown? Who created these conditons for the perfect storm? Perhaps only Graner, the former prison guard, was really a bad apple, in that he enjoyed behaving cruelly towards his charges. But the others? How did they go along with something so disgraceful and un-American? Why did they participate, if only to laugh and point and take photos? Why did they not step up and say something?
(And when someone did speak out, the guy who reported the shameful photos, he was 'outed' by Rumsfeld as an example of valour... and was later afraid to leave his parents' house in Frederick, MD, for the death threats against him... why was he treated this way?)
These are not new questions. (Dr Nolan's course, "Ethics and National Security," addresses a lot of these questions about why people act/don't act for the public/moral good in an organziational context. I highly recommend it.)
[Hannah Arendt's book "Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil" looks at Adolf Eichmann's 1963 trial in Israel for crimes against humanity and the Jewish people for his role as the "organizer" of the Nazi death-machinery. She argues that people always have the ability to make a moral choice, even in totalitarian systems. (We read this in Dr. Nolan's class and it was one of the best books I've read in graduate school.)]
24 March 2008
"To be honest, the whole time I never really felt guilty because I was following orders and I was doing what I was supposed to do."
-Lynndie England, in an interview with German newsmagazine Stern.de, on her role in the maltreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib that became the international scandal.
This post is in the vein of the 3rd question from Dr. C's email:
"Based on the film, the class discussion and the readings, what specific policy changes to US military doctrine would decrease the levels of atrocity by US forces in conflict situations and in detention?"
..but with a slight diversion to include this really interesting interview
In trying to reduce the levels of mistreatment of protected persons in the Iraq conflict, it is important to recognize that the tone of the whole operation is set by the most senior personnel, in this case the President, Secretary of Defense, Theater Commander and on down the line, to the lowliest bottlewasher.
This is a point Wilmer makes, in looking at how the boundaries of "us" and "them" are formed and deliniated. The ICRC also makes this point in the executive summary we read, at least in a round-about way in its examination of why soliders do the inappropriate/wrong/wicked things they do. While the ICRC emphasizes that soliders need to be held accountable when they break the rules of war, the ICRC seemed to shy away from saying just what I said: the tone comes from the top, to use a management expression. (This is how diplomacy works-- reading between the lines for the unsaid.) I look at the role of 'tone' in the Abu Ghraib detention situation and then conflict situations.
Our film, "Ghosts of Abu Ghraib," made this point about tone. The film's take on how this shameful episode occured was basically that a reserve Military Police (MP) unit was assigned to run a detention centre at Saddam's infamous Abu Ghraib prison. When the MPs were allowed to run the prison in the conventional way, and there was a low inmate-to-staff ratio, things were fine, as prisons in war zones go.
According to the film, things at Abu Ghraib changed for the worse (for both staff and detainees) when several things occured:
1) more people were being picked up for alledged involvement with the growing insurgency and the population grew rapidly, while the number of staff did not,
2) Military Intelligence (MI) increased its presence in the prison, and detainees were seen as a resource for intelligence on the surgency,
3) the General who was in charge of setting up the Guantanamo facility was sent to make Abu Ghraib into a facility that produced more, and more useful intelligence. It was this General who transferred the running of the prison from the MPs to the MI staff,
4) One Charles Grener seems to have been given free rein to treat the prisoners as he wished, with a smile and a nod from the MI staff. The film noted that he came from the domestic US prison system-- I wonder if he behaved like that in his previous positions, especially with regard to the use of sexual humilitation, intimidation and violence. This raises serious questions about the treatment of prisoners in US facilities, which have further policy implications.
The film would have the viewer believe that the orders for the maltreatment of the detainees at Abu Ghraib came from on high. We have some evidence of efforts made in this direction, such as the memos that we read last week that reinterpret the official position on torture and hence military interrogation techniques. There also may be evidence in the language and rhetoric used by senior personalities in describing members of the insurgency, Al Qaeda in Iraq, etc. (This would be a good study, if only I knew how to do such a thing-- blending linguistics with IR, delicious!!) It is here that we're fortunant to see that Lynndie England, one of the ladies at Abu Ghraib who seemed to enjoy her role in humiliating and degrading the prisoners there, gave an interview with Stern.de. Here are two questions and responses that tie into the issue of whether the leaders gave the authorization or wink-wink for MI to use physical maltreatment to get what interrogators wanted:
"Stern: The former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, called you and your colleagues the "rotten apples" of the military. Bush claimed to be ashamed of what you did.
England: Well, back then I thought: How can they say that when it was happening all over Iraq. The same thing is happening in Guantanamo now and other places. We knew that our officers knew about it and our sergeants. We thought if they know then somebody else knows. And I really do still think that Rumsfeld knew what was going on. I mean he had been there while I was there at that prison. And if he was there I know he knew what was going on. How could he have not known? And Bush? He's the headman."
S: Saying you were a puppet again makes you sound like a victim.
E: Okay, I do take responsibility. (...) But when you're in the military you automatically do what they say. It's always, "Yes Sir, No Sir." You don't question it. And now they're saying, "Well, you should have questioned it."
England is playing the 'I was just following orders" card and the "I was doing what was expected of me" card. We know that 'following orders' is not an acceptible excuse after Nuremberg, but I think she's onto something in explaining that the US military culture inside Abu Ghraib made such disgraceful behaviour "normal."-- this is Wilmer's very point. It would also be seized upon by those who study institutional and organizational cultures and how they operate.
The organizational culture of militaries that are engaged in counterinsurgency operations (COIN Ops) is also relevant here; I've run across some of this working on my policy paper but haven't focused on it. My guess is that it would deal with what happens when you have an organized military fighting an invisible insurgency, and how on earth this is done. Certain strategies are better than others, while the most effective ones in the short-term are usually the most brutal. (more further research for me)
So, policy changes to decrease atrocities against the population at large and detainees.
1) The tone from the top must change. The Administration has been calling anyone who opposes US policy in Iraq 'terrorists'. Some of them are. But many are not. They just want to 1) run their country their way, 2) evict the people who screwed up their country for their own half-assed reasons and based on their unrealistic neo-con world-view, and 3) make sure their own group (ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, whatever) doesn't get screwed by any of the other groups. (This really is the world the Hobbes described)
By calling all of these people 'terrorists' (and probably not just the violent ones), these people are being labeled in such a way as to deny their genuine and bona fide aspirations, positions, methods etc. And when that's done, it's easier to group them together and assign characteristics. And these characteristics are not flattering, so the dehumanization, scapegoating etc begin.
When an 18 year old from a village in Kansas hears this rhetoric, about 'savage, rag-head terrorists', how does one expect him/her to see the Iraqis s/he interacts with, especially if his/her duties are to look for bona fide terrorists and murderers? What happens when a prison guard who is already accustomed to brutality is put in a position of virtually unlimited power over his charges, who are not seen as people worthy of respect because they're "terrorists"?
Also, cultural awareness training of individual troops can only do so much if one thinks of the Iraqis as "terrorists" before you even have reason to believe them as such.
The tone at the top is everything. In the business world, it plays a great role in worker morale and all of the good that flows from good energy in an enterprise. (In the 1980s American corporations were very keen to emulate Japanese morale and tone practices, trying to achieve the same level of productivity.) There is a reason the publisher of the Nazi propaganda newspaper Der Stürmer, Julius Streicher, was hanged at Nuremburg in 1946.
2. Other COIN methods must be used, that do not create witch-hunts and generate more resentment against the US and US forces for ruining and occupying their country. The Administration realised this a few years ago, hence the campaign to both win hearts and minds, and to understand Iraqi political and tribal culture in order to build the necessary alliances to stop Al Qaeda types and rely on traditional justice schemes to keep ordinary crime in check. I would argue that continuing to help improving the economic situation in Iraq will keep people from being idle and/or being tempted to turn to crime or terrorism as a way to supporting themselves and families. Clearly this is difficut, given the differences in culture, the fact that Iraq is still in a feudal stage of development culturally and the troop-to-population ratio. But these efforts have been successful and must continue.
For detainees, they must not be brutalized and forced to give confessions. Those are the tactics of the Spanish Inquisition, not the US. There are other, humane, effective methods of interrogation. What was done in the past, for example?
This post is in the vein of the 3rd question from Dr. C's email:
"Based on the film, the class discussion and the readings, what specific policy changes to US military doctrine would decrease the levels of atrocity by US forces in conflict situations and in detention?"
..but with a slight diversion to include this really interesting interview
In trying to reduce the levels of mistreatment of protected persons in the Iraq conflict, it is important to recognize that the tone of the whole operation is set by the most senior personnel, in this case the President, Secretary of Defense, Theater Commander and on down the line, to the lowliest bottlewasher.
This is a point Wilmer makes, in looking at how the boundaries of "us" and "them" are formed and deliniated. The ICRC also makes this point in the executive summary we read, at least in a round-about way in its examination of why soliders do the inappropriate/wrong/wicked things they do. While the ICRC emphasizes that soliders need to be held accountable when they break the rules of war, the ICRC seemed to shy away from saying just what I said: the tone comes from the top, to use a management expression. (This is how diplomacy works-- reading between the lines for the unsaid.) I look at the role of 'tone' in the Abu Ghraib detention situation and then conflict situations.
Our film, "Ghosts of Abu Ghraib," made this point about tone. The film's take on how this shameful episode occured was basically that a reserve Military Police (MP) unit was assigned to run a detention centre at Saddam's infamous Abu Ghraib prison. When the MPs were allowed to run the prison in the conventional way, and there was a low inmate-to-staff ratio, things were fine, as prisons in war zones go.
According to the film, things at Abu Ghraib changed for the worse (for both staff and detainees) when several things occured:
1) more people were being picked up for alledged involvement with the growing insurgency and the population grew rapidly, while the number of staff did not,
2) Military Intelligence (MI) increased its presence in the prison, and detainees were seen as a resource for intelligence on the surgency,
3) the General who was in charge of setting up the Guantanamo facility was sent to make Abu Ghraib into a facility that produced more, and more useful intelligence. It was this General who transferred the running of the prison from the MPs to the MI staff,
4) One Charles Grener seems to have been given free rein to treat the prisoners as he wished, with a smile and a nod from the MI staff. The film noted that he came from the domestic US prison system-- I wonder if he behaved like that in his previous positions, especially with regard to the use of sexual humilitation, intimidation and violence. This raises serious questions about the treatment of prisoners in US facilities, which have further policy implications.
The film would have the viewer believe that the orders for the maltreatment of the detainees at Abu Ghraib came from on high. We have some evidence of efforts made in this direction, such as the memos that we read last week that reinterpret the official position on torture and hence military interrogation techniques. There also may be evidence in the language and rhetoric used by senior personalities in describing members of the insurgency, Al Qaeda in Iraq, etc. (This would be a good study, if only I knew how to do such a thing-- blending linguistics with IR, delicious!!) It is here that we're fortunant to see that Lynndie England, one of the ladies at Abu Ghraib who seemed to enjoy her role in humiliating and degrading the prisoners there, gave an interview with Stern.de. Here are two questions and responses that tie into the issue of whether the leaders gave the authorization or wink-wink for MI to use physical maltreatment to get what interrogators wanted:
"Stern: The former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, called you and your colleagues the "rotten apples" of the military. Bush claimed to be ashamed of what you did.
England: Well, back then I thought: How can they say that when it was happening all over Iraq. The same thing is happening in Guantanamo now and other places. We knew that our officers knew about it and our sergeants. We thought if they know then somebody else knows. And I really do still think that Rumsfeld knew what was going on. I mean he had been there while I was there at that prison. And if he was there I know he knew what was going on. How could he have not known? And Bush? He's the headman."
S: Saying you were a puppet again makes you sound like a victim.
E: Okay, I do take responsibility. (...) But when you're in the military you automatically do what they say. It's always, "Yes Sir, No Sir." You don't question it. And now they're saying, "Well, you should have questioned it."
England is playing the 'I was just following orders" card and the "I was doing what was expected of me" card. We know that 'following orders' is not an acceptible excuse after Nuremberg, but I think she's onto something in explaining that the US military culture inside Abu Ghraib made such disgraceful behaviour "normal."-- this is Wilmer's very point. It would also be seized upon by those who study institutional and organizational cultures and how they operate.
The organizational culture of militaries that are engaged in counterinsurgency operations (COIN Ops) is also relevant here; I've run across some of this working on my policy paper but haven't focused on it. My guess is that it would deal with what happens when you have an organized military fighting an invisible insurgency, and how on earth this is done. Certain strategies are better than others, while the most effective ones in the short-term are usually the most brutal. (more further research for me)
So, policy changes to decrease atrocities against the population at large and detainees.
1) The tone from the top must change. The Administration has been calling anyone who opposes US policy in Iraq 'terrorists'. Some of them are. But many are not. They just want to 1) run their country their way, 2) evict the people who screwed up their country for their own half-assed reasons and based on their unrealistic neo-con world-view, and 3) make sure their own group (ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, whatever) doesn't get screwed by any of the other groups. (This really is the world the Hobbes described)
By calling all of these people 'terrorists' (and probably not just the violent ones), these people are being labeled in such a way as to deny their genuine and bona fide aspirations, positions, methods etc. And when that's done, it's easier to group them together and assign characteristics. And these characteristics are not flattering, so the dehumanization, scapegoating etc begin.
When an 18 year old from a village in Kansas hears this rhetoric, about 'savage, rag-head terrorists', how does one expect him/her to see the Iraqis s/he interacts with, especially if his/her duties are to look for bona fide terrorists and murderers? What happens when a prison guard who is already accustomed to brutality is put in a position of virtually unlimited power over his charges, who are not seen as people worthy of respect because they're "terrorists"?
Also, cultural awareness training of individual troops can only do so much if one thinks of the Iraqis as "terrorists" before you even have reason to believe them as such.
The tone at the top is everything. In the business world, it plays a great role in worker morale and all of the good that flows from good energy in an enterprise. (In the 1980s American corporations were very keen to emulate Japanese morale and tone practices, trying to achieve the same level of productivity.) There is a reason the publisher of the Nazi propaganda newspaper Der Stürmer, Julius Streicher, was hanged at Nuremburg in 1946.
2. Other COIN methods must be used, that do not create witch-hunts and generate more resentment against the US and US forces for ruining and occupying their country. The Administration realised this a few years ago, hence the campaign to both win hearts and minds, and to understand Iraqi political and tribal culture in order to build the necessary alliances to stop Al Qaeda types and rely on traditional justice schemes to keep ordinary crime in check. I would argue that continuing to help improving the economic situation in Iraq will keep people from being idle and/or being tempted to turn to crime or terrorism as a way to supporting themselves and families. Clearly this is difficut, given the differences in culture, the fact that Iraq is still in a feudal stage of development culturally and the troop-to-population ratio. But these efforts have been successful and must continue.
For detainees, they must not be brutalized and forced to give confessions. Those are the tactics of the Spanish Inquisition, not the US. There are other, humane, effective methods of interrogation. What was done in the past, for example?
13 March 2008
How best to teach math to kids, pt. 2
Y'all might remember my posting from some weeks ago where a noted mathematics professor advocated that kids not be taught fractions in elementary school. Here's a story with the findings of a presidential panel on math education.
The panel found that kids should not only be taught fractions but they should be taught better and more strongly, along with basic math and geometry, to provide a solid base for algebra and higher math.
My beef is not with the's panel's recommendation-- I agree that strong basic math skills are essential to being able to do algebra and other higher math. My beef is that 1) math was taught to me as torturously as possible, 2) I had enough mean, bad or otherwise ineffecive teachers to last a lifetime and 3) I see now that I've struggled all the way up needlessly-- I just wasn't being taught right. (Except for trig and calculus-- notoriously dificult for most but simple for me since I had a phenominal teacher, and even chemistry wasn't too horrible is something I used to know how to do, because I had a good teacher.)
Maybe math education would be better if they didn't make us cram so many topics in together and focused on the more important of the algebraic topics, since a lot of the stuff they tortured us with in Algebra II, for example, I've never since used and no long remember how to do (along with trig, calc and chemistry--- oh well)
Or maybe I'm just biased and bitter, based on years of soul-crushing, discouraging failures in math-land. Maybe I just don't think that way and just don't get the "logic" of it (ok, I don't.) But I really hope some other kid doesn't go through what I did, and having it be largely for naught...
The panel found that kids should not only be taught fractions but they should be taught better and more strongly, along with basic math and geometry, to provide a solid base for algebra and higher math.
My beef is not with the's panel's recommendation-- I agree that strong basic math skills are essential to being able to do algebra and other higher math. My beef is that 1) math was taught to me as torturously as possible, 2) I had enough mean, bad or otherwise ineffecive teachers to last a lifetime and 3) I see now that I've struggled all the way up needlessly-- I just wasn't being taught right. (Except for trig and calculus-- notoriously dificult for most but simple for me since I had a phenominal teacher, and even chemistry wasn't too horrible is something I used to know how to do, because I had a good teacher.)
Maybe math education would be better if they didn't make us cram so many topics in together and focused on the more important of the algebraic topics, since a lot of the stuff they tortured us with in Algebra II, for example, I've never since used and no long remember how to do (along with trig, calc and chemistry--- oh well)
Or maybe I'm just biased and bitter, based on years of soul-crushing, discouraging failures in math-land. Maybe I just don't think that way and just don't get the "logic" of it (ok, I don't.) But I really hope some other kid doesn't go through what I did, and having it be largely for naught...
04 March 2008
"Keep your old love letters. Throw away your old bank statements."
PeaceTurkey's recent posting on graduation songs reminded me of this one. It was popular when I was in high school (not my year though) and I've thought about some of its lines over the years.
So, even though I'm not graduating just yet, here it is (with Spanish subtitles none the less-- that would have pleased me even more in high school)
So, even though I'm not graduating just yet, here it is (with Spanish subtitles none the less-- that would have pleased me even more in high school)
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